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The	 southern	 enlargement	 in	 the	 1980s	 is	 the	 only	 one	 that	 led	 to	 a	 substantial	 increase	 in	 non-
compliance.	 Particularly	 surprising	 for	 the	main	 compliance	 theories,	which	 focus	 on	 state	 power,	
adjustment	 costs,	 administrative	 capacities,	 or	 legitimacy,	 is	 the	 good	 performance	 of	 the	 post-
communist	Central	and	Eastern	European	new	member	states	after	the	eastern	enlargement	in	the	
2000s.	Our	analysis	suggests	that	the	use	of	pre-accession	conditionality	in	the	eastern	enlargement	
















patterns	across	 the	 four	enlargement	 rounds.	Particularly	 surprising	 is	 the	good	 compliance	of	 the	
post-communist	new	member	states	in	the	eastern	enlargement	in	the	mid-2000s.	This	paper	suggests	
that	 their	 good	 compliance	 is	 not	 simply	 the	 result	 of	 a	 temporary	 ‘newness	 effect’,	 nor	 of	more	
generous	 transition	 periods	 and	 (temporary)	 exemptions,	 nor	 of	 a	 decoupling	 of	 good	 formal	
transposition	of	EU	directives	 into	national	 law	from	their	practical	 implementation	on	the	ground.	












Southern	 counterparts	 despite	 equally	 unfavourable	 country-level	 characteristics,	 such	 as	 low	










deliberate	 decisions	 not	 to	 comply	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 the	 costs	 of	 compliance.	 This	 is	 precisely	 the	
mechanism	underpinning	the	hypothesis	that	greater	preference	diversity	through	enlargement	leads	
to	an	increase	in	non-compliance.	A	key	source	of	preference	diversity	and	related	costs	of	compliance	
is	 wealth:	 richer	 states	 with	 more	 demanding	 regulatory	 standards	 generally	 face	 lower	 costs	 in	







various	 enlargement	 rounds).	 Power-based	 enforcement	 approaches	 would	 thus	 expect	 non-
compliance	 to	be	particularly	problematic	 in	 the	Northern	enlargement	of	 1973	 (that	 included	 the	
United	Kingdom	(UK))	and	the	Southern	enlargement	(with	Spain).	Conversely,	compliance	would	be	
less	problematic	in	the	Eastern	enlargement	(although	it	included	Poland,	it	did	so	alongside	11	smaller	









political	 willingness.	 Countries	 that	 use	 their	 administrative	 capacities	 efficiently	 in	 the	
implementation	of	 EU	 law	are	better	 compliers	 than	 those	with	weak	 and	 corrupt	 administrations	
(Börzel	et	al.	2010;	Hille	and	Knill	2006).1	Administrative	capacities	clearly	separate	the	Northern	and	
EFTA	enlargement	rounds,	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	Southern	and	Eastern	enlargement	rounds,	on	
the	 other	 (see	 figure	 3).	 The	 UK	 and	 Denmark	 (and	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent	 Ireland)	 in	 the	 Northern	










For	 legitimacy	 approaches,	 finally,	 a	 key	 determinant	 of	 states’	 decisions	 about	 compliance	 is	 the	






by	 accepting	 new	 members	 could,	 hence,	 undermine	 compliance.	 However,	 for	 two	 of	 the	









Another	 strand	 of	 legitimacy	 approaches	 does	 not	 focus	 on	 the	 length	 of	 membership,	 but	 on	
prevailing	 attitudes	 within	 a	 state	 towards	 European	 integration	 as	 a	 key	 determining	 factor	 for	
compliance.	 Governments	 (and	 publics)	 that	 have	 a	 strong	 normative	 attachment	 to	 European	
integration	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 consider	 compliance	 with	 EU	 law	 as	 appropriate	 behaviour.	 In	 this	
respect,	the	Northern	and	the	EFTA	enlargement	rounds	again	broadly	contrast	with	the	Southern	and	
Eastern	 enlargements	 (see	 figure	 4).	 The	 countries	 that	 joined	 in	 1973	 and	 1995	 are	 generally	
considered	Eurosceptic,	showing	a	low	net	support	for	EU	membership	(with	the	exception	of	Ireland,	
and	to	some	extent	Finland);	they	had	initially	chosen	to	remain	outside	the	integration	project	and	
eventually	 joined	 as	 a	 result	 of	 economic	 considerations	 despite	 continued	 reservations	 against	
political	integration.	By	contrast,	for	the	Southern	and	Eastern	European	countries	that	joined	the	EU	
after	 their	 successful	 transition	 to	 democracy,	 EU	 membership	 was	 not	 only	 considered	 to	 be	
materially	beneficial,	but	part	of	a	return	to	the	European	community	of	states	with	which	they	share	




To	 assess	 compliance	 with	 EU	 law,	 we	 use	 data	 on	 infringement	 proceedings	 that	 the	 European	
Commission	has	been	opening	against	member	states	for	violating	EU	law.	The	European	Commission	













In	 general,	 we	 should	 be	 careful	 when	 using	 infringement	 data	 as	 an	 indicator	 of	 compliance	 (cf.	





businesses,	 and	 civil	 society	 and	 private	 interest	 organizations.	 To	 examine	whether	 cross-country	
differences	in	the	role	of	such	societal	groups	could	bias	the	data,	we	explicitly	consider	the	possibility	
of	 a	 decoupling	 of	 formal	 and	 practical	 compliance.	 Second,	 infringement	 cases	 record	 the	
Commission’s	view	of	what	constitutes	a	violation	of	EU	 law	and	 the	Commission	has	discretion	 in	
pursuing	suspected	non-compliance.	Crucially,	however,	there	is	no	evidence	that	infringement	data	
is	 systematically	 biased	 towards	 certain	 member	 states	 (cf.	 Börzel	 et	 al.	 2010).	 Certain	 caveats	
notwithstanding,	infringement	cases	are	thus	not	only	the	most	systematic	and	comparable	source	of	




For	 comparisons	 over	 different	 time	 periods,	 additional	 considerations	 are	 necessary.	 Simple	













Figure	 5	 reveals	 that	 the	 southern	 enlargement	 is	 the	 only	 enlargement	 round	 that	 substantially	
increased	non-compliance	in	the	EU.	Greece,	Spain	and	Portugal	display	a	considerably	higher	number	
of	average	infringements	than	the	(then)	old	member	states.	By	the	sixth	year	of	membership,	the	new	












Eastern	 enlargements.	 With	 Denmark,	 the	 Northern	 enlargement	 also	 brought	 one	 of	 the	 EU’s	





Sedelmeier	 2008;	 Sedelmeier	 2012;	 Toshkov	 2008;	Dimitrova	 and	 Toshkov	 2007;	 Steunenberg	 and	
Toshkov	2009;	Zhelyazkova	et	al.	2014;	Zhelyazkova	et	al.	2017).	Moreover,	they	do	not	only	transpose	
directives	as	fast,	or	even	faster,	than	the	old	member	states	but	also	tend	to	settle	their	infringement	










member	 states,	 the	 eastern	members	 differ	 significantly	when	 it	 comes	 to	 complying	with	 EU	 law	










None	of	 the	main	 approaches	 to	 compliance	 can	 fully	 explain	 the	 non-compliance	 patterns	 across	





the	 even	 less	 wealthy	 post-communist	 new	 members	 performed	 so	 well.	 By	 the	 same	 token,	
management	 approaches	 capture	well	 the	 poor	 performance	 of	 the	 southern	 enlargement	 round,	
which	is	largely	due	to	these	countries’	weak	administrative	capacities.	However,	similar	administrative	














Newness,	 differentiated	 integration	 and	 decoupling:	 alternative	 explanations	 for	 the	 good	
compliance	of	new	members	
We	 identify	 three	 sets	of	alternative	explanations	 for	 the	good	compliance	of	new	members	more	
generally,	as	well	as	 for	 the	particularly	puzzling	performance	of	 the	eastern	new	members.	These	
explanations	are	rather	ad	hoc,	since	they	are	not	systematically	derived	from	any	specific	compliance	
theory.	The	first	set	focuses	on	the	possible	temporary	nature	of	new	members’	good	compliance.	The	







them	 into	 the	 EU’s	 compliance	 system.	 In	 particular	 the	 southern	 new	members	 are	 said	 to	 have	
initially	 benefitted	 from	 a	 more	 lenient	 treatment	 (Börzel	 2000),	 which	 would	 explain	 why	 their	
compliance	became	inferior	to	that	of	the	old	member	states	only	by	the	fourth	year	after	accession.	
A	second	reason	for	the	initial	good	compliance	patterns	is	that	newcomers	might	feel	under	particular	
reputational	 pressures	 to	 establish	 a	 track	 record	 of	 good	 performance.	 They	 would	 then	 make	
extraordinary	efforts	during	their	first	years	of	membership,	but	this	effect	should	wear	off	once	they	
do	not	feel	any	longer	under	particular	observation.	If	such	periods	of	grace	and	‘honeymoon	periods’	











of	 longer-term	 trends.	 Compliance	 during	 the	 very	 first	 few	 years	 of	 membership	 seems	 to	 have	
benefitted	from	a	period	of	grace	or	a	honeymoon	 in	the	case	of	the	southern,	and	even	the	EFTA	






enlargement	 rounds.	 Exemptions	 from	 the	 obligations	 of	 EU	 law	 for	 newcomers	 can	 ease	 their	
compliance	problems.	While	they	are	only	temporary,	especially	in	the	case	of	eastern	enlargement,	
some	of	these	exemptions	still	applied	12	years	after	accession.	
The	use	of	differentiated	 integration	 in	the	EU’s	primary	and	secondary	 law	has	 increased	over	the	
years,	whereby	opt-outs	from	EU	treaty	changes	only	started	to	take	off	after	the	Maastricht	Treaty	

















still	 too	early	 to	 tell	 but	 the	number	of	 exemptions	 granted	 to	 them	 is	 only	 slightly	 above	 the	old	










prominent	 in	 the	 case	 of	 eastern	 enlargement.	 Some	 case	 study	 research	 suggests	 that	 the	






regard	 to	 the	 transposition	 of	 EU	 legislation	 into	 national	 law,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 behavioural	
compliance	–	poor	practical	application	on	the	ground	–	on	the	other.	In	the	‘world	of	dead	letters’	
(Falkner	et	al.	2008),	EU	law	gets	swiftly	and	correctly	incorporated	into	national	law	but	is	not	put	into	






transposition	 and	 practical	 application.	 Also,	 the	 formal	 compliance	 records	 of	 the	 eastern	 new	
members	vary	too	much	for	decoupling	to	be	a	uniform	phenomenon.	More	substantively,	case	studies	





relevant	 domestic	 enforcement	 bodies	 for	 workplace	 regulation	 are	 particularly	 weak	 in	 post-
communist	new	members	(Falkner	2010).	Little	evidence	of	a	general	‘eastern	world	of	dead	letters’	is	









that	 decoupling	 is	 not	 more	 prominent	 in	 the	 new	members	 than	 in	 the	 old	 members,	 with	 the	
exception	of	social	policy.		
Of	course	such	counter-evidence	to	decoupling	can	also	be	criticised	for	relying	on	evaluation	reports	







Analysis	 of	 compliance	 across	 new	 members	 and	 enlargement	 rounds:	 does	 pre-accession	
conditionality	matter?	
The	discussion	of	ad	hoc	alternative	explanations	shows	that	these	cannot	overcome	the	difficulties	
that	general	compliance	theories	have	 in	explaining	 the	unexpectedly	good	compliance	of	 the	new	












We	 conduct	 different	 regression	 analyses	 of	 the	 four	 explanatory	 factors	 identified	 by	 the	 main	
compliance	 approaches,	 using	 the	 following	 indicators:	 Shapley	 Shubik	 Index	 (Shapley	 and	 Shubik	
1954;	Rodden	2002)	 for	power,	GDP/capita	for	adjustment	costs,	 the	bureaucratic	quality	 indicator	
developed	by	the	International	Country	Risk	Guide	for	administrative	capacities,	and	net	support	for	





robustness	 check,	 three	models	 that	 operationalize	 the	dependent	 variable	 –	 non-compliance	 –	 in	
different	ways	to	control	for	time-varying	factors	that	affect	all	member	states	equally.	 In	addition,	
due	 to	 the	 high	 correlation	 between	 the	 indicators	 for	 wealth	 (GDP/capita)	 and	 administrative	
capacity,	we	run	each	model	first	excluding	administrative	capacity	and	then	excluding	wealth.		










(although	not	very	 strongly	 so),	but	not	when	 including	 instead	bureaucratic	quality.	 In	 the	 former	
16	
	
case,	 GDP/capita	 also	 reaches	 significance,	 while	 in	 the	 latter	 case,	 both	 power	 and	 bureaucratic	
quality	do.	













ways	 in	 which	 the	 experience	 of	 conditionality	 could	 continue	 to	 affect	 compliance	 positively	
(Sedelmeier	2008:	820-22;	Sedelmeier	2016).	First,	 the	creation	of	highly	specialised	administrative	
and	legislative	capacities	during	the	pre-accession	period	to	transpose	large	amounts	of	EU	law	in	a	
short	 time	 may	 compensate	 for	 the	 relatively	 low	 general	 administrative	 capacities	 of	 the	 post-















the	 sanctions	 contained	 in	 Article	 7	 TEU,	 while	 otherwise	 complying	 with	 the	 acquis	 to	 continue	
enjoying	 the	benefits	of	EU	membership.	To	 the	extent	 that	pre-accession	conditionality	helped	 to	
build	capacities	for	post-accession	compliance	with	the	aquis,	compliance	will	continue	to	benefit	even	








than	 the	 older	member	 states.	 The	 positive	 record	 of	 new	member	 states	 in	 general,	 and	 of	 the	
compliance	 patterns	 across	 the	 various	 enlargement	 rounds	 is	 difficult	 to	 explain	 for	 the	 main	




the	 eastern	 enlargement,	 can	 explain	 the	 positive	 record	 of	 these	 new	 members,	 we	 conducted	
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regression	 analyses	 of	 all	 new	 member	 states	 during	 their	 first	 ten	 years	 of	 membership.	 These	





However,	 to	avoid	a	negative	 impact	on	compliance,	pre-accession	conditionality	has	an	 important	
role	to	play	and	needs	to	be	taken	very	seriously.	Rather	than	a	newcomer	bonus	or	differentiated	
integration,	the	creation	of	highly	specialised	administrative	and	legislative	capacities	during	the	pre-


























1	 Another	 factor	 that	 weakens	 the	 capacity	 of	 states	 to	 comply	 with	 their	 international	 commitments	 are	


























Börzel,	 T.A.	 (2009)	 'New	 Modes	 of	 Governance	 and	 Accession.	 The	 Paradox	 of	 Double	
Weakness',	 in	T.A.	Börzel	 (ed.),	Coping	with	Accession	 to	 the	European	Union.	New	
Modes	of	Environmental	Governance,	Houndmills:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	pp.	7-31.	
Börzel,	T.A.,	Hofmann,	T.,	Panke,	D.	and	Sprungk,	C.	 (2010)	 'Obstinate	and	Inefficient.	Why	





Börzel,	 T.A.	 and	 Schimmelfennig,	 F.	 (2017)	 'Coming	 Together	 or	 Driving	 Apart?	 The	 EU’s	
Political	 Integration	 Capacity	 in	 Eastern	 Europe',	 Journal	 of	 European	 Public	 Policy	
(forthcoming).	






Crawford,	 B.	 and	 Lijphart,	 A.	 (1997)	 'Explaining	 Political	 and	 Economic	 Change	 in	 Post-








Falkner,	 G.,	 Treib,	 O.,	 Hartlapp,	 M.	 and	 Leiber,	 S.	 (2005)	 Complying	 with	 Europe.	 EU	
Harmonization	and	Soft	Law	in	the	Member	States,	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	
Press.	
Falkner,	 G.,	 Treib,	 O.	 and	 Holzleitner,	 E.	 (2008)	Compliance	 in	 the	 European	Union.	 Living	
Rights	or	Dead	Letters?,	Aldershot:	Ashgate.	
Goetz,	K.H.	(2005)	'The	New	Member	States	and	the	EU:	Responding	to	Europe',	in	S.	Bulmer	
and	 C.	 Lequesne	 (eds),	The	Member	 States	 of	 the	 European	Union,	 Oxford:	Oxford		
University	Press,	pp.	254-80.	















Mbaye,	 H.A.D.	 (2001)	 'Why	 National	 States	 Comply	 with	 Supranational	 Law.	 Exlaining	
Impementation	 Infringements	 in	 the	 European	 Union	 1972-1993',	 European	 Union	
Politics	2(3):	259-81.	






Schimmelfennig,	 F.	 and	 Sedelmeier,	 U.	 (2005)	 'Conclusion.	 The	 Impact	 of	 the	 EU	 on	 the	







Schimmelfennig,	 F.	 and	 Winzen,	 T.	 (2017)	 'Eastern	 Enlargement	 and	 Differentiated	
Integration:	Towards	Normalization',	Journal	of	European	Public	Policy	(forthcoming).	
Schwellnus,	G.	(2009)	'It	Ain't	Over	When	it's	Over:	The	Adoption	and	Sustainability	of	Minority	









communist	 New	Member	 States',	 European	 Integration	 Online	 Papers	 13(Art.	 23):	
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2009-023a.htm.	
Sedelmeier,	 U.	 (2012)	 'Is	 Europeanisation	 Through	 Conditionality	 Sustainable?	 Lock-In	 of	
Institutional	Change	After	EU	Accession',	West	European	Politics	35(1):	20-38.	
Sedelmeier,	U.	(2016)	'‘Compliance	after	Conditionality:	Why	Are	the	European	Union’s	New	










Hungary',	 in	 F.	 Schimmelfennig	 and	 U.	 Sedelmeier	 (eds),	 The	 Europeanization	 of	
Central	and	Eastern	Europe,	Ithaca:	Cornell	University	Press,	pp.	156-77.	





Tallberg,	 J.	 (2002)	 'Paths	 to	 Compliance.	 Enforcement,	 Management,	 and	 the	 European	
Union',	International	Organization	56(3):	609-43.	






Toshkov,	 D.	 (2010)	 'Taking	 Stock:	 A	 review	 of	 Quantitative	 Studies	 of	 Transposition	 and	
Implementation	of	EU	Law',	eif	Working	Paper	01/2010.	






Trauner,	 F.	 (2009)	 'Post-accession	 Compliance	 with	 EU	 Law	 in	 Bulgaria	 and	 Romania:	 A	


































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11











1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11





























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11










1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11






































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42
Old	member	states
1973	enlargement
1981/86	enlargement
1995	enlargement
2004/07	enlargement
